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ENGLISH LABOR LAW - THE 1984 TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES
ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON UNIONS' LEGAL STATUS
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1984, the United Kingdom enacted the Trade Union
Act, placing new restrictions on trade union autonomy.' The Act
requires unions to adopt prescribed internal procedures designed to
enhance trade union "democracy." ' 2 Failure by a union to institute
these provisions results in the loss of immunity from civil and criminal
liability.3
The Trade Union Act requires the election of all voting members
of a union's executive council by secret ballot every five years. 4
Furthermore, the Act makes ratification by postal or secret ballots
a prerequisite to the commencement of any form of industrial action.s
Only union members, however, may bring suit to enforce provisions
of the Act. 6
This Act further restricts the use of union dues for "political
purposes"; 7 specifically, the general membership must endorse the
existence of any political fund via secret ballot every ten years.8 Only
I Trade Union Act, 1984, ch. 49. The Act was the third in a series of laws
designed to address the problems of work stoppages. On the average, England loses
440 work days per 1000 employees annually. This figure compares to 30 lost work
days per 1000 employees annually in Germany and 170 lost work days per 1000
employees annually in France. Industrial Relations Europe, July 1985 at 2, col. 2.
2 DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS, CMD. 8778 (1983), para. 56.
Trade Union Act, 1984, ch. 49.
4 Id.
5 Id. Such proposals are not new to debates on English labor law. In fact, in
1980 the government rejected a back-bench effort to include these proposals in the
1980 Employment Act. Interestingly, the government endorsed these provisions only
three years later. TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, CMD. 9128 (1983), para. 246. See also
983 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 227 (1980).
Trade Union Act, 1984, ch. 49. This provision of the Act seriously limits its
effectiveness. Rather than forcing unions to comply with its guidelines, the Act
merely requires a union to evaluate the loyalty of its rank-and-file. The Act places
a heavy burden on workers by requiring -them to institute lawsuits to trigger the
statute.
Id.
Id.
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money emanating from the fund may be used to further the union's
political objectives. 9 By establishing these procedural guidelines, the
Conservative Government hopes to increase union "democracy" by
making ruling councils more responsive to the rank-and-file mem-
bership. 0 Trade Union Act, 1984.
The Trade Union Act renews a debate concerning the scope of
government regulation over trade unions, a controversy ingrained in
English labor law." The degree of permissible statutory intrusion
depends on government's view of the legal status of trade unions as
either "voluntary," "quasi-corporate," or fully "incorporate."'" If
government regards unions as incorporated, it may justify the reg-
ulation of the union's infrastructure and the union's external activ-
ities.' 3 Conversely, if government sees union membership as voluntary,
it can only justify restrictions on external "illegal" activity that
members as individuals cannot legally perform. 4 Finally, treatment
of unions as quasi-corporate justifies regulation of both "legal"
external activity that members as individuals can participate in legally
and "illegal" activity. 5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The House of Lords first addressed the controversy of a union's
legal status in Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway
" The strict controls placed on trade union political funds stand in stark contrast
to the minimal standards imposed on corporations. The 1967 Companies Act requires
directors to disclose the amount of donations and the identity of the recipients in
their annual reports. The Companies Act, 1967, § 19.
10 DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS, supra note 2.
" R. KIDNER, TRADE UNION LAW 4-6 (1983). See also 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR
AND THE LAW (1983); J. CRONIN & R. CRIME, LABOUR LAW (1970).
12 See R. Kidner, Trade Union Democracy: Election of Trade Union Officers,
13 INDUS. L.J. 193 (1984). Kidner uses the term "incorporate" to denote a mandatory
association, or one of compelled membership. Kidner describes a "quasi-corporate"
association as "nebulus," since it maintains characteristics of both voluntary and
corporate associations. See also 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 236-70. Kahn-
Freund defines a voluntary union organization as one in which workers are free to
choose to associate or disassociate.
,1 As Kahn-Freund notes, it is the voluntariness of union membership that keeps
unions democratic. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 270-74. Absent this restraint
on union leadership activity, the insulation generally provided to leadership would
isolate it from the general membership. To retain "democratic" stature, the unions
must then adopt internal mechanisms to insure accountability of the leadership to
the rank-and-file. Democracy within trade unions is necessary because of their unique
role within society. See R. KIDNER, supra note 11, at 4-7.
"4 See supra note 13; see also 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 270-74. External
activity consists of strikes, secondary picketing, work slow-downs, etc.
'1 Legal activity includes contributions to political funds, which individuals can
do freely but only within certain guidelines. Trade Union Act, 1984, ch. 49.
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Servants. 6 In holding trade unions civilly liable for acts of members,
the House of Lords granted legal status to trade unions.' 7 The ju-
diciary failed, however, to define the exact boundary of this newfound
legal status, refusing to label it either incorporate or quasi-incor-
porate. 8 Nevertheless, the court clearly rejected the posture of unions
as voluntary organizations.
In Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, 9 how-
ever, the court took a further step toward adopting the "incorporate"
or the "quasi-incorporate" approach. 20 The plaintiff in Osborne sought
to prevent his union from contributing to political parties, theorizing
that a trade union is not a voluntary organization.2 ' Consequently,
the plaintiff believed it a "monstrous injustice [to compel] men who
have been forced into the union" to support financially its political
activities. 22 In finding for the plaintiff, the court implicitly adopted
his view that trade unions are nonvoluntary.2 1
The resulting outcry from these decisions forced legislators into
the controversy.2 4 The government's first response limited union li-
ability for the acts of union members "committed by or on behalf
of union members." ' 25 In effect, this Act provided trade unions with
1 Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901]
A.C. 426.
' R. KIDNER, supra note 11, at 4. "The decision in Taff Vale Railway Company
v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants that [unions] could be sued in their
own name, and damages obtained out of their funds destroyed [the] effective im-
munity" afforded trade unions status as "unicorporated associations." R. RIDEOUT,
PRINCIPLES OF LABOUR LAW 311 (1979).
,1 C. DRAKE, LABOUR LAW 213 (1981). Only Lord Brompton was willing to assign
a quasi-corporate status to unions in Taff. Id.; see Taff Vale Railway Co., [19011
A.C. 426.
9 [19011 C.H. 163.
Z J. RIDDALL, THE LAW OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 49 (1981).
2' W. OSBORNE, MY CASE 39 (1910); see also J. RIDDALL, supra note 20, at 49-
50.
22 J. RIDDALL, supra note 20, at 49-50.
23 See Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1909] A.C. 195,
195-96. L.J. Farwell's opinion inherently suggests that union membership is not
voluntary: "It is also necessary for his freedom that he shall not have been coerced
into supporting by money or otherwise the candidate whom he wishes to oppose."
Id. at 195.
24
Member after member rose from different parts of the House to explain
that they had pledged themselves to vote for the complete immunity which
trade unions were suppose to have been granted ... and the most powerful
Government hitherto known was constrained ... to pass the Trade Disputes
Act of 1906.
J. RIDDALL, supra note 20, at 49.
25 Id.; see also Trade Disputes Act, 1906.
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immunities or privileges unavailable to voluntary organizations, in-
corporated associations, or individuals, recognizing legislatively the
quasi-corporate status suggested in Taff.26
The initial Act also removed restrictions on unions' abilities to
maintain political funds, but permitted a union member to limit his
dues to non-political funds. 27 These provisions suggest that the leg-
islature "compromise[d] between two democratic necessities .... *"28
Thus, while moving unions toward autonomy and voluntary legal
status, the Act recognized the unique nature of union membership. 29
The legislature recognized unions' legal status as quasi-corporate, but
was unsure what degree of intrusion was permissible and where quasi-
corporate status fell in respect to voluntary and incorporate status.30
From 1913 until 1956, statutory and case law clearly held that
"registered trade unions [were] not a simple incorporated association"
like a "tea club" or "philatelic society." 3' In Bonsor v. Musicians'
Union,32 the court clarified unions' status.3 3 The plaintiff sought to
hold his union liable for wrongfully discharging him from its ranks.
Prior to enactment of the Trade Union Act of 1913, the court
dismissed a similar suit in Kelly v. National Society of Operative
Printer's Assistants, 4 where it viewed trade unions as voluntary or-
ganizations.35 Seeking to reverse Kelly, the plaintiff in Bonsor argued
that "[a] registered trade union is a legal entity, though not a cor-
2 The 1906 Act provided immunity for organizations' industrial actions. Prior
to the Act the common law clearly held such acts violative of statutory law. See,
e.g., Lyons v. Wilkins, [18961 C.H. 811; Lyons v. Wilkins [18991 C.H. 255. But
see CITRINE, TRADE UNION LAW 558-62 (3d ed.); see also Hubbard v. Pitt, 1975
Indus. Cas. R. 308, 317 (Lord Denning, dissenting). Further, the Act did not restrict
the manner in which unions chose to use industrial action or to exempt individual
members from a "coerced" participation.
27 Trade Union Act, 1913.
20 Id. § 3.
29 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 247.
30 See id. at 247, 274. While Kahn-Freund argues that the statute favors union
autonomy, the Act still restricts union activity by preventing the union from com-
pelling members to contribute money for a political fund. The statute seeks to protect
the minority because of the special status unions maintain in society. See R. KIDNER,
supra note 11, at 4-5.
31 C. DRAKE, supra note 18, at 213; see Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act,
1927; Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946; see also Barker v. Allanson,
[1937] 1 K.B. 463. See generally J. RIDDALL, supra note 20, at 53-56.
32 [1956] A.C. 104.
11 Id.; see also C. DRAKE, supra note 18, at 213.
3- [1915] 31 TLR 632.
35 Id.
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poration. It is a quasi-corporation. ' 36 Overruling Kelly, the court
accepted the plaintiff's argument that unions are quasi-corporate,
expressly rejecting the defendant's contention that unions lacked legal
entity status and should be considered voluntary.3 7 This decision firmly
established trade unions' quasi-corporate status. 31
This quasi-corporate status remained unchallenged until 1968. Then,
in an effort to combat economic stagnation, the Labour Government
appointed the Donovan Commission.39 Among a variety of suggestions
regarding the restructuring of worker-employer-union relationships,
the Commission recommended that unions be assigned corporate legal
status. ° The Labour Government failed, however, in implementing
the Commission's recommendations, and general discontent with the
freedoms afforded trade unions restored the conservatives to power
and brought a new approach to trade unions.4 '
In 1971 the Conservative Government passed the Industrial Rela-
tions Act, 42 which addressed the "disorderly condition of industrial
relations. 4 3 The Act expressly provided for a change in legal status
by directing that "[a] registered trade union becomes a full incor-
porated body upon registration. '" 44 The Act also created a cause of
action in workers fired for failing to join a union.4 5 In effect, the
16 Bonsor, [19561 1 A.C. at 110.
11 Id. at 107. The defendant contended that unions are not of themselves legal
entities; rather, that they are only associations of legal entities or individuals. Con-
sequently the defendant claimed that unions cannot independently enter contracts
or other legal relationships. Id.
18 C. DRAKE, supra note 18, at 213; see also R. KIDNER, supra note 11, at 4
(arguing that Bonsor pushes union status closer to total incorporation).
J9 I. RIDDALL, supra note 20, at 58.
" C. DRAKE, supra note 18, at 213.
41 WEEKES, MELLISH, DICKENS, & LLOYD, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE LIMITS
OF LAW (1955). After the Donovan Commission's report, the Labour Government
issued a white paper, "In Place of Strife," which sought to implement much of
the Commission's recommendations. Strong Trade Union Council (TUC) opposition,
however, forced the Labour Government to withdraw the recommendations and
adopt a more conciliatory position. Id. at 1-4. Nonetheless the TUC's victory was
shortlived. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
41 Industrial Relations Act, 1971. The Act amended many of the provisions of
the pre-1970 legislation and took a more active role in limiting trade union activities.
C. DRAKE, supra note 18, at 2.
41 J. RIDDALL, supra note 20, at 60. The legislation emanated from a Conservative
Party paper entitled "Fair Deal at Work." The paper contained most of the sug-
gestions from the Labour Government's white paper "In Place of Strife." Id.; see
supra note 41.
4 Industrial Relations Act, 1971, § 74.
.4 J. RIDDALL, supra note 20, at 60. This portion of the Act seems paradoxical
19861
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Act subjected trade unions to unprecedented levels of legislative in-
trusion .46
Trade unions' corporate legal status was shortlived. In 1974, the
Labour party regained control of Parliament and reinstituted unions'
quasi-corporate status.47 The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act,
197448 specifically prohibited the treatment of unions as corporate
organizations, conferring upon them "quasi-corporate attributes." 49
In essence, the Act restored the legal status of trade unions to the
pre-1971 status quo. 50 This status quo remained unchallenged until
the Trade Union Act, 1984.11
III. COMMENT
While on its face the 1984 Trade Union Act leaves untouched
unions' quasi-corporate status as found within the 1974 Act, the 1984
Act in effect restores union status to the corporate level by regulating
trade unions' infrastructure.12 In attempting to justify this regulation,
the government contends that a lack of democracy within trade unions
necessitated statutory intervention.5 3
since it seeks to restore unions to the status of voluntary associations while treating
them as incorporate organizations.
- Previous legislation dealt with liability for industrial actions, while case law
limited union liability to industrial action *and "wrongful dismissals." See Bonsor,
[1956] 1 A.C. 104. Here the 1971 Act created liability arising out of the employer-
union relationship regarding closed shop agreements and constituted the first intrusion
into "collective" agreements of this type. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at
248.24 C. DRAKE, supra note 18, at 213; R. KIDNER, supra note 11, at 4; J. RIDDALL,
supra note 20, at 63; see also Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974.
4H Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, 1974.
49 C. DRAKE, supra note 18, at 213.
5,, Id.
11 See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 270-90; see also R. KIDNER, supra
note 11, at 4-6. In 1980 a back-bench attempt was made to assign corporate status
to trade unions. However, the Thatcher government refused to disturb the status
quo, at least temporarily. See R. Kidner, supra note 12.
32 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
" R. KIDNER, supra note 51, at 193-94. The government stated that the high
incidence of industrial conflict resulted from militant officials who received au-
thorization for industrial action in "rowdy open air meetings which were a travesty
of Democracy." J. Hutton, Solving the Strike Problem: Part H of the Trade Union
Act 1984, 13 INDUS. L.J. 212; see also Trade Union Immunities, CMD. 8128, para.
247 (1983).
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Such a justification implicitly supposes that unions are corporate
entities.14 Traditionally, "internal" trade union democracy55 was not
viewed as a necessary restraint on trade union officials since "a
[union is] always and inevitably threatened by disruption because it
is a fighting body which may be attacked" by external forces.5 6 These
external forces allow discontented members to form competing or-
ganizations and secede from the union. 7 This "mortal threat of
secession" requires union leaders to remain responsive to the changing
political posture of the general membership. 8
The traditional approach assumes, however, that union membership
is voluntary, or at least quasi-voluntary, with individuals retaining
the right to move freely in and out of the union organization. 9 In
other words, the presumed quasi-corporate status provided to trade
unions made internal regulation unnecessary. The government's po-
sition, as reflected in the 1984 Trade Union Act, assumes that trade
unions are corporate entities, not voluntary associations. This ap-
proach more accurately reflects present labor relations.
Trade union membership is no longer voluntary. The nature of
employer-union relations compels trade union membership. Employers
and the union generally negotiate collective agreements that guarantee
a "closed shop" workplace.60 This closed shop agreement makes union
membership a prerequisite to employment and severely inhibits seces-
sion. 6 1
14 Corporate entities in this context are organizations with compelled membership.
See R. Kidner, supra note 12.
11 "Internal" democracy simply refers to the internal mechanisms of the trade
union (e.g., the manner of electing officials and the process of ratifying strikes).
16 "External forces" refers to the union system itself (e.g., the ability of members
to secede and refuse to join the rank-and-file). Specifically, external forces are forces
beyond the control of unions which act as constraints on their autonomy with respect
to the rank-and-file. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 273-74.
57 Id.
18 See generally id. at 270-90.
' See id; see also R. KIDNER, supra note 11; C. DRAKE, supra note 18.
A closed shop is "a situation in which employees come to realize that a particular
job is only to be obtained and retained if they become and remain members of one
of a specified number of trade unions." W. MCCARTHY, THE CLOSED SHOP IN
BRITAIN 3 (1964). In the United States a different method of unionization is employed.
Unions are chosen through "certification" by the workers; therefore, no preexisting
agreement is present. The only role played by the management/employer is the
ratification of the election results. Cox, Box & GORMAN, LABOR LAW 262 (1981).
61 See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11 at 236-70.
1986]
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Absent the "mortal threat" of secession, union leaders arguably
become isolated from the rank-and-file. 62 This combination of com-
pelled membership and leader isolation places at risk rank-and-file
members' inherent rights regarding important work-related decisions. 63
The creation of internal "democratic" mechanisms seeks to protect
these rights.6
Assuming that the government correctly assessed the nature of
current labor practices, an argument remains as to whether its chosen
course properly addresses the problem by attempting to protect union
members' inherent rights through these "democratic" guarantees.
Critics assert that the ideal of trade union democracy is unattainable
because of the lack of parties within the union structure. 65 "As we
in our present world understand 'democracy' it presupposes parties.
This means that there must inside the body politic, be groups rep-
resenting different interests and ideals. . .. "66 Further, the potential
for secession arguably implies that parties cannot exist in unions. 67
The existence of parties would result in constant splintering into
factional trade unions after each election. 68
Initially, these arguments incorrectly assume that "parties" within
a union can splinter to form their own unions. As noted, closed shop
agreements prevent the free flow of non-union labor.69 By splintering
off from the recognized union, insurgent members lose their jobs
and, consequently, the base needed to establish a competing union.70
62 Id.
6,3 These inherent rights include the right to ratify a strike, to determine the
acceptability of employment contracts, and to determine the interests sought during
negotiation. The test of union democracy is whether the union enhances the interests
of its members. L. ALLEN, POWER IN TRADE UNIONS 56 (1954). To enhance members'
interests effectively, union officials must be able to identify the interests of union
members. Id. Such an identification process necessarily assumes that union leaders
are not isolated. See id.
- See Kidner, supra note 12, at 193-94; see also Trade Union Act, 1984. See
generally Democracy in Trade Unions, CMD. 8778 (1983).
6 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 273-74.
Id. at 272.
67 Id. at 273-76.
6I Id.
6 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
71 Examining the situation from the employer's perspective, an employer would
not want a competing union since it could be both confusing and time consuming.
Different unions require separate agreements, resulting in two sets of negotiations.
Also, perceived friction between the competing unions may persuade an employer
to release a militant union member rather than retain him and his splintered or-
ganization.
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The reality of existing employer-union practices therefore requires
competing parties to remain within the union organization.
Further, the suggestion that "parties" are necessary for the existence
of democracy seems erroneous. Parties are simply the conglomeration
of individuals with similar viewpoints. Democracy does not require
formalized parties; rather, democracy implies the tolerance of factions
opposed to incumbent officers. 7 The survival of factions limits lead-
ers' isolation and requires responsiveness to membership demands. 72
Democratic procedures protect factional interests by providing a
forum for their existence. Elections present an opportunity for fac-
tional groups to express their philosophies, by allowing both leadership
and opposition a vehicle for evaluating changes in membership in-
terest. The net result is a more responsive system since the process
creates a method for determing rank-and-file interests.
Democracy, then, protects membership rights through increased
responsiveness. The question remains, however, whether the 1984
Trade Union Act effectively achieves trade union democracy. Taken
by itself, Part I of the 1984 Act seeks to establish democracy by
outlining election guidelines. 7 These procedures require the free elec-
tion by all voting members of the executive councils every five years. 74
Despite its initial appearance, however, the Act goes beyond mere
implementation of democratic guidelines. The Act intrudes into the
internal affairs of unions, in direct contravention of International
Labour Organization (I.L.O.) standards. Convention No. 87 of the
I.L.O. directs governments to afford unions "the right to draw up
their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full
freedom, to organize their administrations and activities and to for-
mulate their programmes. ' 75 The 1984 Trade Union Act limits these
forms of trade union autonomy by establishing guidelines for union
elections, effectively rewriting most union constitutions. 76 While the
Act may solve the problem of trade union democracy, it creates a
71 Martin, Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework, 2 Soc. 205 (1968).
72 Id.
1 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
74 Id.
7 Survey by Committee of Experts on Freedom of Association and Collective
Bargaining, I.L.O. Geneva, 1983, paras. 149-74. See R. Kidner, supra note 12, at
195.
76 Supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. The provisions regarding union elections
affected by the 1984 Act are generally found within a union's constitution. Thus,
to impose restrictions different than those presently in force effectively rewrites the
union's constitution. See R. Kidner, supra note 12, at 193-94.
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new problem by improperly limiting trade union autonomy.
To attack the problem of trade union democracy within the pa-
rameters created by the I.L.O. convention, the government must
regulate union activity through external controls. For instance, the
government should require the recertification of unions by the rank-
and-file instead of regulating internal elections. 77 The recertification
process would create a forum for factional interest groups and provide
union leaders with a mechanism to assess these factional views. 78
Further, the recertification process insures that union leadership will
remain responsive to the wishes of its membership because of the
threat of expulsion. 79 Thus, the recertification process and its "mortal
threat" of expulsion provide the government a method of guaranteeing
union democracy within I.L.O. guidelines.
While this procedure creates democracy within trade unions, gov-
ernments must remain cognizant of an individual or "minority"
worker's interest in not joining a union. "No one must be exposed
to the dilemma between joining a union he does not want to join,
and not obtaining or holding a job he wants to obtain or hold." 80
Workers have a viable interest in remaining independent of unions
since union activity extends beyond the workplace. 8' Requiring in-
dividual workers to support these extended activities as a condition
of employment offends notions of fairness and democracy.82
77 As previously noted, in the United States workers choose the union they wish
to join collectively through a process called certification. Recertification amounts to
an extension of this principle. Rather than voting for individual union leaders,
workers would vote to retain or expell the existing union. This process eliminates
control over the internal operations of union elections, but insures that unions will
remain responsive to rank-and-file wishes, or face expulsion. Further, by requiring
automatic recertification, individual workers no longer bear the burden of enforcing
the statute. This result counteracts a serious flaw in the 1984 Act. For more back-
ground on the certification/recertification process, see Cox, supra note 60, at 262.
Regarding the flaw in the 1984 Act, see R. Kidner, supra note 12, at 210-11.
11 With respect to factional interests and elections, see supra notes 71-72, and
accompanying text.
79 A worker's power to secede amounts to a "mortal threat" to the existence of
a trade union by threatening its power base. Extending this argument further, the
threat of expulsion, which would dissolve the local union, acts as a similar restraint
on union activity. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 274; see also supra notes
36-58 and accompanying text.
10 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 236. See R. KIDNER, supra note 11, at
88-103.
"I See Osborne, [1911] C.H. 540; see also supra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text.
92 Osborne, [1911] C.H. 540; see R. KIDNER, supra note 11, at 88-103; see also
0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 234-40.
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To protect an individual's right to remain independent, the gov-
ernment must replace "closed" or "union" shop agreements with
"agency" shops. 83 Such a system protects individual rights while
reducing traditional friction between union and "free riders" since
it requires all individuals to pay a portion of union dues for the
services provided during negotiations.8 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1980 Employment Act marked an attempt by the Conservative
Government to restrict closed shop agreements, but "stopped short
of a direct and outright onslaught upon the practice of the closed
shop." 85 A "direct and outright onslaught" must be instituted to
insure individual worker rights. Further, both unions and employers
should face sanctions in an effort to dismantle the closed shop system,
since employers also tacitly encourage the system. 6
The 1984 Trade Union Act evidences a concern for trade union
democracy and worker rights. In attempting to address these concerns,
1 For a definition of "closed shop" see supra note 60. A union shop agreement
requires "employees in a given bargaining unit to become members thirty days after
being hired." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741 (1963). See generally
Cox, supra note 60, at 1056-80. An "agency shop" gives a worker two choices once
employed:
(a) he can become a member of one of the registered unions with whom
an agreement exists;
(b) he may decline such membership but pay the equivalent of union
dues to one such union. In that case he can be a member of some other
organization of workers if he chooses, or he may remain outside any or-
ganization.
R. RIDEOUT, TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW 43 (1973).
84 See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954) (court "recognized
the validity of unions' concern about 'free riders,' - employees who receive the
benefits of union representation but are unwilling to contribute their fair share of
financial support to such unions - and gave the unions the power to contract to
meet that problem").
11 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 252; see The Employment Act, 1980. The
Act allows workers to avoid union membership if they "genuinely object on grounds
of conscience or other deeply held personal convictions. . . ." 0. KAHN-FREUND,
supra note I1, at 253. In effect, the Act required "conscientious objectors" to make
affirmative claims that could result in litigation. Thus while the Act afforded workers
an opportunity to reject "compelled" membership, the workers could still be dis-
missed and would then bear the burden of proving the reasonableness of their
objections. Such a costly and time consuming burden limits the effectiveness of the
1980 Act. Id. at 252-61.
- The Employment Act, 1980; see 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 11, at 252.
17 Such a provision would eliminate "tacit" closed shop agreements. The 1982
Employment Act recognized the possibility of tacit employer/union agreements and
outlawed dismissals for non-membership of a union as an automatically unfair
dismissal. See Employment Act, 1982.
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the Act assigns trade unions corporate legal status. The result of this
determination led the government to institute controls on the manner
employed by unions to elect its officials. Such regulation, however,
invades the rights of unions according to I.L.O. provisions. By in-
stituting a recertification procedure and eliminating closed shop agree-
ments, the government can address its concerns within I.L.O. standards.
Bret J. Pangborn
